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Note 
 
Oh the Places Stockholders Will Go! A Guide for 
Navigating Forum Selection Bylaws Outside of 
Delaware 
Stephanna F. Szotkowski* 
Until 2010, the law regarding intra-corporate disputes was 
relatively settled: stockholders initiated derivative suits in the 
state of incorporation on behalf of and in the name of the corpo-
ration.1 More often than not, litigants chose Delaware, the state 
of incorporation for most corporations.2 Vice Chancellor Laster 
of the Delaware Court of Chancery questioned this presumptive 
default in his 2010 In re Revlon opinion.3 He suggested that 
corporations could adopt charter provisions selecting an exclu-
sive forum for intra-corporate litigation.4
 
*  J.D. Candidate 2014, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2010, 
University of Wisconsin-Madison. I would like to thank Professors Jessica 
Clarke, Claire Hill, John Matheson, and Brett McDonnell as well as Mary 
Eaton and Joel Greenberg for their invaluable guidance in preparing this 
Note. Special thanks to Melissa Card, Rachel Kitze, Robin Lehninger, Kim 
Scriver, Emily Willborn, and the members of the Minnesota Law Review for 
their comments and editing assistance. Finally, deepest thanks to my parents, 
Peter and Nancy, my brothers, Peter and Sam, and Daniel Eck for their love 
and support. Copyright © 2014 by Stephanna F. Szotkowski. 
 These unprecedented 
words appeared to give corporate boards of directors the green 
light to confine certain types of suits to the Delaware Court of 
Chancery, eliminating shareholders’ opportunities for multi-
 1. See Joseph A. Grundfest, The History of Intra-Corporate Forum Selec-
tion Clauses: An Empirical Analysis, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 333, 336−37 n.10 
(2012).  
 2. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisure-
ly Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 
553, 578 (2002) (stating that 85% of corporations that incorporated out-of-state 
choose to incorporate in Delaware).  
 3. See In re Revlon Inc., S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 
2010) (“[I]f boards of directors and stockholders believe that a particular forum 
would provide an efficient and value-promoting locus for dispute resolution, 
then corporations are free to respond with charter provisions selecting an ex-
clusive forum for intra-entity disputes.”). 
 4. Id. 
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forum litigation and forum shopping.5 This simultaneous exist-
ence and lack of a choice had never before been self-evident.6 
The Vice Chancellor mentioned certificates of incorporation, 
but not bylaws7—it remained unclear whether forum selection 
bylaws would be enforceable.8
The first case outside of Delaware testing these new pa-
rameters was Galaviz v. Berg.
 
9 Oracle Corporation’s board of 
directors amended its bylaws after (later-alleged) wrongdoing 
to provide for exclusive litigation in Delaware.10 The District 
Court for the Northern District of California refused to enforce 
the forum selection clause.11 The court reasoned that as a mat-
ter of federal common law and not Delaware General Corpora-
tion Law (DGCL), directors could not control forum selection by 
unilateral action in a manner that could not be achieved in con-
tract law, which requires mutual assent to contractual modifi-
cations.12
Together, In re Revlon and Galaviz generated significant 
questions about the utility and enforceability of forum selection 
clauses in the corporate context. They reignited an ongoing de-
bate about the proper role of the corporate board in relation to 
stockholders; they drew attention to the phenomenon of multi-
jurisdictional litigation and entrepreneurial plaintiffs that 
drove the need for forum selection.
  
13
 
 5. The forum selection clause would apply in four types of suits: deriva-
tive, fiduciary duties, suits involving Delaware General Corporate Law, and 
internal affairs suits. See, e.g., Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron 
Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 950–51 (Del. Ch. 2013); Joseph A. Grundfest & Kristen A. 
Savelle, The Brouhaha over Intra-Corporate Forum Selection Provisions: A Le-
gal, Economic, and Political Analysis, 68 BUS. LAW. 325, 358 n.156 (2013).  
 Practitioners advised their 
 6. Grundfest, supra note 1, at 336−38. 
 7. In re Revlon, 990 A.2d at 960 n.8. 
 8. Commentators generally agreed that forum selection clauses in corpo-
rate charters were enforceable. See, e.g., Brian J.M. Quinn, Shareholder Law-
suits, Status Quo Bias, and Adoption of the Exclusive Forum Provision, 45 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 137, 141–42 (2011). Due to the greater consensus in this 
area, the enforceability of forum selection clauses in charter provisions will not 
be the focus of this Note. 
 9. 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 10. Id. at 1171–72 (overcharging the United States government millions 
of dollars in the sale of software and licenses). 
 11. Id. at 1171. 
 12. Id. at 1174–75.  
 13. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Foreword: The Delaware Court of Chan-
cery: Change, Continuity—and Competition, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 387, 
390−92. 
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clients to include such clauses, “just in case.”14 Proxy advisor 
groups encouraged corporations not to adopt clauses in their 
bylaws.15 Stockholder plaintiffs challenged directors’ unilateral 
adoption of forum selection bylaws through derivative litiga-
tion.16 Proponents countered with director authority and fiduci-
ary duty analyses.17
In Boilermakers, Chancellor Strine upheld forum selection 
bylaws unilaterally adopted by the boards of directors of Chev-
ron and FedEx, two Delaware corporations that faced deriva-
tive suits.
 Then, on June 25, 2013, the Delaware 
Court of Chancery handed down a much-anticipated decision 
that arose from a wave of derivative suits filed in February 
2012.  
18 The ruling limited its analysis to clarifying that by-
laws are statutorily and contractually valid; it did not discuss 
fact-laden fiduciary duties.19 The decision erased much of the 
uncertainty surrounding forum selection bylaws, but signifi-
cant questions remain.20 The impact of the holding outside of 
Delaware for Delaware corporations remains tenuous.21
 
 14. See, e.g., Bonnie White, Note, Reevaluating Galaviz v. Berg: An Analy-
sis of Forum-Selection Provisions in Unilaterally Adopted Corporate Bylaws as 
Requirements Contracts, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 390, 391 n.4 (2012).  
 Poten-
 15. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, CORPORATE GOV-
ERNANCE POLICIES 1.9 (2013), available at http://www.cii.org/corp_gov_ 
policies. Proxy advisor groups make recommendations for and gather most of 
their data from proxy seasons, the time of the year when most corporations 
hold their annual stockholder meetings. See, e.g., Paul Rose, On the Role and 
Regulation of Proxy Advisors, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 62, 62–63 
(2011). Their impact comes primarily from increased stockholder scrutiny gen-
erated by their recommendations; they are highly influential in corporate gov-
ernance. See, e.g., id.  
 16. See, e.g., Verified Complaint at ¶ 74, Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. 
Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2012) (No. 7220), 2012 WL 
485390 [hereinafter Biolermakers Verified Complaint]. 
 17. See Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 5, at 330; see also infra Part II(B). 
 18. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 939. 
 19. Id. at 950–58 (explaining that forum selection clauses that relate to 
“internal affairs” are proper subject matter of bylaws and that they constitute 
“flexible,” unilaterally-adopted contracts between the stockholders and the 
board). 
 20. See Theodore Mirvis, Surrender in the Forum Selection Bylaw Battle, 
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (Oct. 28, 2013, 9:21 
AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/10/28/surrender-in-the-forum 
-selection-bylaw-battle.  
 21. Since the plaintiffs in Boilermakers withdrew their appeal to the Del-
aware Supreme Court, the decision from the Delaware Court of Chancery 
stands. It is therefore only persuasive precedent for non-Delaware courts, 
which will have to choose whether to accept Chancellor Strine’s reasoning. 
BONNIE J. ROE ET AL., THE FUTURE OF EXCLUSIVE FORUM BYLAWS (2013), 
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tial choice of law, choice of forum, fiduciary duties, and judicial 
applications of public policy permutations will likely result in 
non-uniform interpretation of the decision.22 Stockholders have 
brains in their heads, feet in their shoes, and may steer them-
selves in any direction they choose, but courts are the ones who 
must decide where they go.23
This Note aims to provide a guide for courts outside of Del-
aware to determine the enforceability of forum selection by-
laws. Though Boilermakers established that forum selection by-
laws are likely enforceable in Delaware, foreign courts must 
contend with how to interpret and apply the decision.
 
24 This 
guide will focus on DGCL law, which presumptively applies to 
“internal affairs” disputes of Delaware corporations.25 It will al-
so limit analysis to how courts should grapple with highly fact-
intensive, potential fiduciary duties cases that Boilermakers 
did not address.26 The guide aims to craft a middle position be-
tween directors’ multi-jurisdictional concerns and stockholders’ 
fiduciary duties worries. Part I describes the terrain: the corpo-
rate-contractual structure, the “Out of Delaware” trend, and 
the In re Revlon, Galaviz, and Boilermakers progression. Part 
II dissects arguments for and against the enforceability of fo-
rum selection bylaws, with a focus on policy, authority, and fi-
duciary duties arguments that structure the multi-step solu-
tion. Part III proposes and applies a framework of decision for 
use in non-Delaware jurisdictions. The solution suggests that 
directors have the authority to adopt forum selection bylaws, as 
upheld in Boilermakers.27
 
available at http://http://www.cohengresser.com/assets/publications/11_1_ 
2013_The_Future_of_Exclusive_Forum_Bylaws_BJR_DHT_JHH.pdf. 
 Stockholder-plaintiffs may rebut this 
presumption by showing that directors have breached their fi-
 22. See Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1175 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (sug-
gesting that directors may lack the power to unilaterally adopt forum selection 
clauses); see also In re Facebook, Inc., IPO Sec. & Derivative Litig., 922 F. 
Supp. 2d 445, 459–63 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding a forum selection clause unen-
forceable).  
 23. See generally, DR. SEUSS, OH, THE PLACES YOU’LL GO! (1990). 
 24. Besides fiduciary duties, they must confront other issues beyond the 
scope of this Note—including potential choice of law, choice of forum, and judi-
cial applications of public policy—which will likely result in non-uniform in-
terpretation of the decision. 
 25. See, e.g., Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 
934, 937 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 26. Id. at 947. 
 27. Id. at 939–41. Forum selection bylaws are “flexible,” binding contracts 
that are presumptively enforceable because of directors’ authority. Id. at 939. 
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duciary duties in adopting a forum selection clause.28 If they 
are successful, directors must demonstrate the “entire fairness” 
of the forum selection bylaw to the stockholders.29 At all times, 
directors may waive the forum selection bylaws if their fiduci-
ary duties so require.30 Hypothetical scenarios demonstrate the 
contours of this approach for breaches of the duty of care and 
loyalty.31
I.  FROM CORPORATE STRUCTURE TO FORUM 
SELECTION   
 Ultimately, this structure provides a solution for non-
Delaware courts that mediates stockholders’ and directors’ re-
spective fiduciary duties and multi-jurisdictional litigation con-
cerns. 
In re Revlon, Galaviz, and Boilermakers have recently 
shaken the world of intra-corporate, derivative litigation. Each 
involves forum selection clauses that require derivative suits 
brought by stockholder-plaintiffs in foreign courts, outside the 
state of incorporation, to be dismissed or transferred.32
A. CORPORATE STRUCTURE 
 To un-
derstand the cumulative import of these cases, the questions 
that they leave unanswered, and the framework for how foreign 
courts may respond, it is necessary to understand the basics. 
This section addresses corporate structure and the history of 
forum selection in the corporate context: the bedrock of this de-
bate. 
The basic corporate structure informs and defines the en-
forceability of forum selection bylaws. Forum selection bylaws 
contain corporate attributes, which will first be analyzed, that 
arise from the legal model of a corporation and its organic cor-
porate documents. Forum selection introduces a contractual el-
ement to the corporate structure that will be analyzed in terms 
 
 28. See infra Part III. 
 29. See infra Part III. 
 30. See infra Part III. 
 31. See Brown v. Slenker, 220 F.3d 411, 424 (5th Cir. 2000) (explaining 
that a fiduciary duties analysis is necessarily case-by-case and highly fact-
dependent); see also Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 95–96 (Del. 1992) (caution-
ing against determining issues involving hypothetical harm). 
 32. See Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 5, at 326 (“[These] provisions are 
thus nothing more than licenses that permit corporations to appear before for-
eign courts to petition for the dismissal of foreign-filed complaints so that the 
litigation can be pursued in the courts of the chartering jurisdiction.”). 
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of its impact on the certificate and bylaws, as well as its bind-
ing precedent. 
1. The Legal Model of the Corporation 
Corporations are statutory creatures, viewed as separate 
legal entities from their stockholder-owners.33 Stockholders’ 
main duties include electing directors and voting on fundamen-
tal corporate actions.34 Directors constitute the decision-making 
and managerial body of the corporation.35 The board of directors 
selects officers.36 Both directors and officers, the corporate 
management organs, have fiduciary duties, contractual re-
quirements, and agency obligations to act in the best interests 
of the corporation.37 Good faith, loyalty, and due care form the 
triad of fiduciary duties in the corporate context, although due 
care and loyalty predominate.38 In litigation, the business 
judgment rule creates a rebuttable presumption that directors 
acted pursuant to their fiduciary duties.39
 
 33. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 365 (8th ed. 2004) (defining a corporation as 
“[a]n entity . . . having authority under law to act as a single person distinct 
from the shareholders who own it.”). 
 If stockholders rebut 
this presumption, courts review the transaction at issue under 
 34. See, e.g., WILLIAM L. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 
150 (4th ed., 1969).  
 35. See, e.g., id. (“[T]he business of a corporation shall be managed by its 
board of directors.”). 
 36. See, e.g., id. 
 37. See John H. Matheson, Choice of Organizational Form for the Start-
Up Business, 1(2) MINN. J. BUS. L. & ENTREPRENEURSHIP 7, 16 (2002). 
 38. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). To fulfill 
their duty of care, directors must engage in a process of informed deliberation. 
Id. Directors’ standard of care for liability is gross negligence. See, e.g., In re 
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 750 (Del. Ch. 2005) (defining 
gross negligence as “reckless indifference to or a deliberate disregard of the 
whole body of stockholders or actions which are without the bounds of reason” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). The duty of loyalty requires directors to 
act in the best interest of the corporation and its stockholders, rather than 
their own personal interests. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812, 816 (Del. 
1984). Self-dealing, when a director is on both sides of a transaction, is a clas-
sic example. See id. at 812. Directors are independent if they make decisions 
based on corporate merits, not personal, extraneous considerations. Id. at 816. 
Delaware courts have considered the duty of good faith a subsidiary element of 
the fundamental duty of loyalty. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 
2006) (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 49, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003)). As 
such, I will focus on the two fundamental fiduciary duties—care and loyalty. 
 39. Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 
1989). 
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an entire fairness standard.40 In addition to fiduciary duties, 
organic corporate documents, the certificate of incorporation 
and bylaws bind shareholders, directors, and officers and struc-
ture internal corporate affairs.41
2. Organic Corporate Documents: Certificate of Incorporation 
& Bylaws 
 
The certificate of incorporation and bylaws serve as the 
main corporate governance and operating documents, respec-
tively.42 In Delaware, after the certificate is filed with the Sec-
retary of State, the board must propose any amendments that 
stockholders approve by a simple majority vote.43 Bylaws gov-
ern internal corporate affairs and relationships among direc-
tors, officers, and stockholders.44 Under the DGCL, “[t]he by-
laws may contain any provision, not inconsistent with law or 
with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of 
the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or pow-
ers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers 
or employees.”45 The power to approve, amend, or repeal bylaws 
vests primarily with stockholders, but can be delegated concur-
rently to directors in the charter.46
 
 40. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 362–64 (Del. 1993), 
modified, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994); Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 
(Del. 1993). 
 Bylaw adoptions are binding 
on directors and stockholders, but they remain subordinate to 
 41. 1 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS § 3:12 (3d ed. 2013). 
 42. See Brett H. McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nomina-
tions, and Poison Pills, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 205, 209 (2005). Varying by ju-
risdiction, the certificate is also called the articles of incorporation or the char-
ter. Id. These terms will be used interchangeably.  
 43. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 103(a)(1) (West 2013) (filing with the Secre-
tary of State), 242(b)(1) (process for amending bylaws). 
 44. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emp. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 234–35 (Del. 
2008); COX & HAZEN, supra note 41, at § 3.12; McDonnell, supra note 42, at 
207, 217, 221 (delineating bylaws’ procedural and corporate governance at-
tributes and defining certain bylaws as a poison pill and a “leading antitakeo-
ver defense”).  
 45. Tit. 8, § 109(b). 
 46. See id. § 109. However, delegation of concurrent power does not limit 
stockholders’ power to amend bylaws. See, e.g., Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 
588 (1933); Kidsco, Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483, 492 (Del. Ch. 1995), aff’d, 
670 A.2d 1338 (Del. 1995); Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of 
Forum, and Delaware’s Stake in Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 132 
(2009). Nor does it limit stockholders’ plenary, statutory, default right. See 
Rogers, 289 U.S. at 588–89.  
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both statutes and charters.47
3. Contractual Views of the Certificate and Bylaws  
 This governance model has ana-
logs in contract law. 
Judicial decisions, including Galaviz and Boilermakers, 
have grappled with how to square the corporate management 
structure with corporations’ contractual attributes.48 Different 
theories define corporations as a nexus of contracts49 or as a le-
gal entity, distinct from its aggregate members.50 Delaware 
courts have historically and recently labeled certificates and 
bylaws in contractual terms.51 In Boilermakers, the court ex-
plained that forum selection provisions constitute binding, 
“flexible” contracts between the corporation and its stockhold-
ers.52 The Galaviz court, in contrast, sought to explicitly divorce 
corporate from contract law.53 However, as Boilermakers 
showed, courts may apply U.S. Supreme Court’s Bremen prece-
dent that had previously only applied to contractual forum se-
lection clauses.54
4. Forum Selection Provisions Are Valid in Contracts  
  
Since the United States Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in 
Bremen, the modern trend is that contractual forum selection 
clauses are prima facie valid.55 The Court strengthened this po-
sition in Carnival Cruise Lines.56
 
 47. See tit. 8, §§ 102(b)(1), 109(b).  
 Parties challenging contrac-
tual forum selection provisions must overcome this presump-
 48. See infra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.  
 49. REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A 
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 6 (2d ed. 2009) (defining a corpora-
tion’s entity as a “nexus of contracts” and a “nexus for contracts”). 
 50. Id. 
 51. See, e.g., Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 
(Del. 2010) (“Corporate charters and bylaws are contracts among a corpora-
tion’s shareholders.”). 
 52. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939 
(Del. Ch. 2013). 
 53. See Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1175 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 54. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund, 73 A.3d at 940 (“Therefore, this 
court will enforce the forum selection bylaws in the same way it enforces any 
other forum selection clause, in accordance with the principles set down by the 
United States Supreme Court in Bremen.”). 
 55. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972). 
 56. Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593−95 (1 991) (extend-
ing Bremen’s presumption of enforceability to standardized form contracts 
that are contracts of adhesion). 
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tion of enforceability.57 When courts encounter these clauses, 
they dismiss, transfer, or stay cases.58 Until very recently, fo-
rum selection clauses abounded in contracts, but not in organic 
corporate documents.59 The trend to superimpose contractual 
structures in the corporate context grew from the “Out of Del-
aware” trend and the phenomenon of multi-jurisdictional litiga-
tion.60
B. FORUM SELECTION IN CORPORATE LAW 
 
Stockholder-plaintiffs who brought derivative suits histori-
cally, presumptively sued in the state of incorporation. This 
was usually Delaware.61 Delaware and its court system confer 
many benefits on its corporations: network externalities, a well-
developed infrastructure of professionals and expert corporate 
judges, equitable corporate law, predictability and expediency 
of decisions, and prestige.62 The Delaware court system was 
and is “the Mother Court of corporate law.”63
 
 57. Hadley v. Shaffer, No. Civ.A. 99-144-JJF, 2003 WL 21960406, at *4 
(D. Del. 2003) (holding that forum selection contractual provisions are pre-
sumptively valid unless “(i) [the forum selection clause] is a result of fraud or 
overreaching; (ii) enforcement would violate a strong public policy of the fo-
rum; or (iii) enforcement would, in the particular circumstances of the case, 
result in litigation in a jurisdiction so seriously inconvenient as to be unrea-
sonable”); see also Sara Lewis, Note, Transforming the “Anywhere but Chan-
cery” Problem into the “Nowhere but Chancery” Solution, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & 
FIN. 199, 207−09 (2008).  
 Pursuant to the 
internal affairs doctrine, the DGCL presumptively governs de-
 58. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(3), 12(b)(6); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a), 
1406 (2012). Or courts apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens for permis-
sive forum selection clauses. See Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 5, at 50−51. 
The Delaware Court of Chancery uses motions to dismiss for improper venue 
under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(3). Id. at 62−63 and its McWane presump-
tion disfavors granting stays for later-filed actions. Stevelman, supra note 46, 
at 62. 
 59. Grundfest, supra note 1, at 338. 
 60. John Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 33−34 J. EMPIRI-
CAL LEGAL STUD. 605, 638−39 (2012). 
 61. Stevelman, supra note 46, at 66−67; Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 
2, at 578. 
 62. See, e.g., John Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 IND. L.J. 
1345, 1348−50 (2012); Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 2, at 556, 588, 596−97. 
 63. Armour et al. supra note 60, at 1346; see John C. Coffee, Jr., Under-
standing the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Pri-
vate Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. 
REV. 669, 679−84 (1986); Stevelman, supra note 46, at 71−72 (adding that 
eighty-five to ninety percent of Delaware Court of Chancery’s opinions are not 
appealed, affirming the acknowledged superiority of their judgments).  
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rivative disputes.64 Businesses incorporate in Delaware, know-
ing that their implicit choice of law is “sticky” and will pre-
sumptively govern outside of Delaware.65 Historically, choice of 
forum for intra-corporate disputes also “stuck.”66 The prevailing 
belief was that both plaintiffs and defendants preferred the 
Delaware court system.67
Changes in federal securities laws, plaintiffs’ strategies, 
and the Delaware Court of Chancery’s responses have coalesced 
into the “Out of Delaware” trend.
 However, scholars have documented 
the movement of intra-corporate litigation out of Delaware 
since the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
68 Delaware courts traditional-
ly took a hands-off approach to multi-jurisdictional litigation.69 
The plaintiffs’ bar responded by what Chancellor Strine has 
deemed the “lead counsel Olympics race.”70 The first entrepre-
neurial plaintiff to file won a lion’s share of the eventual award 
and an effectual stay of later-filed, substantially similar com-
plaints.71 This approach resulted in a flurry of low-quality 
pleadings due to the significant first-mover advantage.72
 
 64. See Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs 
Doctrine 6 (Emory L. & Econ. Research Paper, No. 06-04, 2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=686592.  
 Vice 
 65. Stevelman, supra note 46, at 80. Known as “Lex Incorporationis,” this 
phenomenon explains that the law of the incorporating state “sticks” to the 
corporation’s internal affairs and provides a “clear, stable rule for resolving 
conflicts of laws questions.” Id.  
 66. Armour et al. supra, note 60, at 637−38. 
 67. Grundfest, supra note 1, at 374 (citing ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENI-
US OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 41 (1993) (“[P]laintiffs do not perceive it to 
be undesirable to litigate in Delaware and instead take advantage of its valu-
able asset of legal capital.”)). Practically, this legal capital included a historical 
laissez faire approach to awarding attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs. The parties 
would agree on the amount and the court would approve it. See Jonathan R. 
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware 
Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 496 (1987). 
 68. See infra notes 70–80. 
 69. See Armour et al., supra note 60, at 622−25. Multiple suits stemming 
from the same set of facts is one of the most noted scenarios underlying the 
“Out of Delaware” trend. Generally, Delaware courts required lawyers to or-
ganize themselves. Id. 
 70. Brian Cheffins et al., Delaware Corporate Litigation and the Fragmen-
tation of the Plaintiffs’ Bar, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 427, 483−84 (2012). 
 71. Stevelman, supra note 46, at 107. 
 72. Edward B. Micheletti & Jenness E. Parker, Multi-Jurisdictional Liti-
gation: Who Caused This Problem, and Can It Be Fixed? 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 
9−10 (2012); Quinn, supra note 8, at 147 (explaining that this probably is 
acute in the merger context, “[w]here there were multiple suits filed, the aver-
age number of lawsuits was 5.3 per transaction, with a median of four law-
suits per transaction”); MARK LEBOVITCH ET AL., BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ 
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Chancellor Chandler responded by identifying factors that the 
court would use to determine lead counsel.73 The Delaware 
Court of Chancery also began to more closely scrutinize attor-
neys’ fee arrangements reached by parties.74
Plaintiffs considered themselves hostages to corporate de-
fendants’ interests; they began filing outside of Delaware.
 
75 
Changes in federal securities laws only augmented these incen-
tives.76 Plaintiffs’ forum-shopping and settlement posturing tac-
tics increased litigation costs for defendants.77 They forced for-
eign courts to decide matters of Delaware law.78 Corporate 
defendants prefer Delaware because of the unpredictability of 
foreign courts and judges’ understanding of corporate law.79
 
BERGER & GROSSMAN, MAKING ORDER OUT OF CHAOS: A PROPOSAL TO IM-
PROVE ORGANIZATION AND COORDINATION IN MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL MERGER-
RELATED LITIGATION 4−5 (2011), available at http://www.blbglaw.com/misc_ 
files/MakingOrderoutofChaos. 
 
Multi-jurisdictional litigation also leaves open the possibility of 
 73. Cheffins et al., supra note 70, at 483 (listing “the quality of the plead-
ings filed, the energy and enthusiasm demonstrated by the attorneys, and the 
economic stake that each plaintiff had in the litigation”). 
 74. Armour et al., supra note 60, at 1359−60; see In re Cox Communica-
tions, Inc. S’holders Litigation, 879 A.3d 604, 643 (Del. Ch. 2005); see, e.g., In 
re Instinent Group Inc., S’holders Litigation (Del. Ch., 2005) (reducing a $1.62 
million fee agreement to $450,000). 
 75. See Stevelman, supra note 46, at 97−98 (“Prior to their tenure . . . 
most Delaware judges were members of corporate/defense-side Wilmington 
law firms.”). 
 76. In the 1980s, securities class action litigation boomed. Id. In response, 
Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
(PSLRA), that included a heightened pleading standard. Pub. L. No. 105-353, 
112 Stat. 3227 (1998). Plaintiffs moved to state court to avoid the PSLRA. See 
Coffee, supra note 63, at 684. Congress responded by passing the Securities 
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA). 112 Stat. 3227. However, 
SLUSA contained a “Delaware “carve-out” exception that exempted actions 
based on corporate law of a corporation’s state of incorporation. Armour et al., 
supra note 60, at 1378. Plaintiffs responded by filing “parallel” or “tagalong” 
derivative suits under state corporate law to qualify and to proceed to discov-
ery that would be unavailable in PLSRA litigation. Id. This did not work in 
Delaware. Id. Delaware courts stay suits when a motion to dismiss is pending. 
Id. at 1378−79. Multi-jurisdictional litigation flourished. 
 77. Micheletti & Parker, supra note 72, at 6−7. 
 78. Stevelman, supra note 46, at 64−65 (detailing Delaware judges’ “h u-
bristic” claim on the development of their law, but noting that foreign rulings 
have no precedential effect on Delaware law, but may serve a policing func-
tion). 
 79. Micheletti & Parker, supra note 72, at 30 (“Company-side lawyers 
[have] said . . . that judges in state courts outside of Delaware were far less 
likely to be expert in corporate law and that their reaction to stockholder suits 
was harder to predict—never a good thing.”). 
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inconsistent outcomes from different judges.80 It wastes judicial 
resources because cases could be consolidated or litigated only 
in one forum.81 In the end, however, stockholders suing on be-
half of the corporation suffer most because multi-jurisdictional 
litigation increases costs to the corporation.82 In response, the 
Delaware Court of Chancery has hesitated to stay concurrent 
proceedings, has attempted to lure plaintiffs back, and has em-
phasized the comparative advantage, predictability, and effi-
ciency of interpreting its own corporate law.83
C. IN RE REVLON, GALAVIZ, & BOILERMAKERS CHANGE INTRA-
CORPORATE LITIGATION 
 Against this 
backdrop, In re Revlon Galaviz, and Boilermakers changed the 
nature of derivative litigation.  
Prior to Vice Chancellor Laster’s In re Revlon decision in 
2010, no opinion had ever considered the possibility of forum 
selection bylaw or certificate provisions.84 The only persuasive 
Delaware case prior to 2010 involved an arbitration clause in a 
LLC agreement.85 Enter In re Revlon.86 Vice Chancellor Laster 
suggested in dicta that corporations may consider adopting fo-
rum selection clauses in their certificates.87 He did not mention 
bylaws. Galaviz was the first case to apply the In re Revlon 
proposition to bylaws.88
 
 80. See Lebovitch et al., supra note 
 The court held that the director-
defendants, who amended the corporation’s bylaws after al-
72, at 2 (posing full faith and due cred-
it problems). 
 81. Quinn, supra note 8, at 152. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Grundfest, supra note 1, at 344 (citing In re Southern Peru Copper 
Corp., 52 A.3d 761, 819 (Del. Ch. 2011) (awarding plaintiffs $304 million in 
attorneys’ fees, $1.347 billion in damages, and pre-judgment interest). 
 84. Grundfest, supra note 1, at 338. Prior to 2010, only sixteen publicly 
traded entities had forum selection clauses in their organic corporate docu-
ments. Id. at 352. Eight were LLCs or LLPs and eight were corporations. Id. 
The earliest clauses appeared in 1991, 1992, and 1994 and then there was a 
twelve year gap until 2006, when Oracle did so, which would later become the 
subject of Galaviz. See id. The first mention of the possibility of using a bylaw 
to introduce a forum selection clause was proposed in 2007. Id. at 338 (credit-
ing Theodore Mirvis, a partner at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz). 
 85. Lewis, supra note 57, at 207 (upholding the provision because the 
Delaware LLC Act does not prohibit such clauses in an LLC agreement).  
 86. In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litigation, 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 
2010). 
 87. Id. 
 88. See generally Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
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leged wrongdoing to include a forum selection clause, could not 
disregard the plaintiffs’ choice of forum.89
After these watershed cases, uneven acceptance and deriv-
ative litigation have defined forum selection bylaws’ short his-
tory until Boilermakers in June 2013.
 
90 To date, 250 publicly-
traded corporations have adopted forum selection provisions.91 
At the same time, proxy advisor groups have been influential in 
discouraging adoption of forum selection bylaws.92 In 2012 
alone, stockholders initiated sixteen derivative suits over adop-
tions of or proposals for forum selection bylaws.93 Most of the 
cases have been resolved by settlement in the stockholders’ fa-
vor, with the exception of derivative litigation against Chevron 
and FedEx, which the Delaware Court of Chancery consolidat-
ed in the Boilermakers case.94
 
 89. Id. at 1174−75 (basing its decision on federal common law). 
  
 90. See infra notes 88−91. 
 91. Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 
934, 944 (Del. Ch. 2013); Claudia H. Allen, Delaware Corporations Seek to 
Counter Forum Shopping, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND 
FIN. REG. (Feb. 14, 2012), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/02/14/ 
delaware-corporations-seek-to-counter-forum-shopping/#more-25698. Contra 
Quinn, supra note 8, at 171−72 (noting that during 2010, severa l high-profile 
Delaware firms went public, including Toys “R” Us, Inc., General Motors 
Company, and Tesla Motors, Inc., and none of them included exclusion forum 
provisions in their corporate charters). 
 92. See Frank Acquila & Anna Kripitz, Forum-Selection Provisions in 
Delaware, SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, https://www.sullcrom.com/ 
Frank-Aquila-and-Anna-Kripitz-Author-Article-on-Delaware-Selection 
-Provisions-08-27-2012/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2014); see also COUNCIL OF IN-
STITUTIONAL INVESTORS, supra, note 15 at 1.9 (“Companies should not attempt 
to restrict the venue for shareowner claims by adopting charter or bylaw pro-
visions that seek to establish an exclusive forum.”); GLASS LEWIS & CO., 
PROXY PAPER GUIDELINES, 2012 PROXY SEASON, 34 (2012), available at http:// 
www.summitinvestmentpartners.com/PDFs/ProxyVotingPolicy1.pdf [hereinaf-
ter GLASS LEWIS]. 
 93. CLAUDIA H. ALLEN, EXCLUSIVE FORUM PROVISIONS: PUTTING ON THE 
BRAKES, BLOOMBERG BNA CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT (2012), 
available at http://www.ngelaw.com/files/Uploads/Images/exclusive-forum 
-provisions-putting-on-the-brakes.pdf. Katie Wagner, Exclusive-Forum Provi-
sions Spur a Backlash: Suits Against Them Are Being Resolved in Stockhold-
ers’ Favor, AGENDA, May 7, 2012, at 10.  
 94. ALLEN, supra note 93, at 2. In February 2012, the firms Prickett, 
Jones & Elliott, P.A. and Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check LLP filed substan-
tially similar suits against 12 Delaware corporations that had adopted the 
same forum selection clauses via bylaws (Air Products and Chemicals, Inc., 
AutoNation, Inc., Chevron Corporation, Curtiss-Wright Corporation, Danaher 
Corporation, FedEx Corporation, Franklin Resources, Inc., Navistar Interna-
tional Corporation, priceline.com incorporated, SPX Corporation, and Superior 
Energy Services, Inc.). Id. Jack in the Box, Inc. was sued in April 2012. Id. In 
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In Boilermakers, the Delaware Court of Chancery limited 
its inquiry to two grounds: whether forum selection bylaws are 
statutorily and contractually valid.95 It replied in the affirma-
tive on both accounts.96 The court in Boilermakers did not at-
tempt a robust fiduciary duties analysis because it chose to ad-
dress facial challenges to legality before it engaged in a “fact-
laden” analysis.97 Chancellor Strine explained forum selection 
clauses regulate proper subject matter per DGCL 109(b), which 
outlines the board’s authority.98 In regulating where stockhold-
ers may bring derivative, fiduciary duties, DGCL, and internal 
affairs suits, forum selection bylaws relate to the “internal af-
fairs” of the corporation – the “business of the corporation,” “the 
“conduct of its affairs,” and the “rights or powers of stockhold-
ers.”99 Contractually, the clauses are prima facie valid and pre-
sumptively enforceable under Bremen, akin to contractual fo-
rum selection clauses.100 These clauses are “flexible,” binding 
contracts between the corporation and stockholders so long as 
the certificate confers power on the board to unilaterally adopt 
bylaws under DGCL 109(a).101
 
April 2012, the two firms also filed derivative lawsuits against four companies 
that planned to address forum selection provisions at their 2012 annual stock-
holder meeting, either via charter amendments (Calix, Inc., Cameron Interna-
tional Corporation, and Fairchild Semiconductor International, Inc.) or via by-
law (Hittite Microwave Corporation). Id. at 3. Of the original twelve 
corporations, only two have fought the suits; the other ten have repealed the 
bylaws in question and the Delaware Court of Chancery has dismissed the 
cases as moot. Id. In March 2012, a second lawsuit was filed against Chevron 
Corporation in the Northern District of California, the same court that decided 
Galaviz. Id. The California court stayed the case on August 9, 2012 for one 
year, pending the Delaware Court of Chancery proceedings. Id. During the 
2012 proxy season, Amalgamated Bank Longview Funds, Roper Industries, 
Inc., Superior Energy Services, Inc., Chevron Corporation, and United Rent-
als, Inc. received stockholder repeal proposals. Id. at 5. Stockholders also sued 
Chevron Corporation and Superior Industries, Inc. Id. Roper Industries sought 
a no-action letter from the SEC, arguing that the stockholder proposal inter-
fered with its ordinary business operations, but the SEC denied the request of 
Roper Industries, along with Superior Energy Services repealed their bylaws. 
Id. The remaining two corporations allowed the proposals, both of which were 
defeated. Id. 
 The court refused to entertain 
plaintiffs’ hypothetical “parade of horribles” of the detrimental 
 95. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 939. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 947. 
 98. Id. at 950–51.  
 99. Id. at 939. 
 100. Id. at 955. 
 101. Id at 957.  
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effects of forum selection bylaws in the absence of a genuine 
controversy with concrete facts.102
The next step in this progression is unclear and complicat-
ed. The impact of Boilermakers will depend on how and if 
courts outside of Delaware apply its holding.
  
103 The stockholder 
plaintiffs in Boilermakers dropped their appeal to the Delaware 
Supreme Court, leaving Chancellor Strine’s June 2013 decision 
as the authoritative word on the subject, for now.104 Since the 
Delaware Court of Chancery held that forum selection clauses 
bylaws relate to the internal affairs of the corporation, the 
DGCL will apply as substantive law and the Boilermakers deci-
sion will govern.105 However, it is possible that non-Delaware 
judges may construe choice of forum as a procedural issue, 
meaning that the law of the forum would govern.106
II.  ARE THEY ENFORCEABLE? AN OVERVIEW OF THE 
COUNTERPARTIES’ AUTHORITY, FIDUCIARY DUTIES, 
AND POLICY ARGUMENTS   
 This Note 
focuses on how courts outside of Delaware will apply Boiler-
makers to potential breaches of fiduciary duties by corporate 
directors and officers—issues that Chancellor Strine did not 
reach. Therefore, it is necessary to delve into arguments for 
and against in forum selection bylaws in the fiduciary duties 
context to understand how to guide non-Delaware courts in ad-
judicating such cases. Boilermakers was groundbreaking, but it 
will not be the last word. 
In order for courts outside of Delaware to determine the 
enforceability of forum selection bylaws in fiduciary duties cas-
es, they will need to interpret Boilermakers in the fiduciary du-
ties context. No court has directly confronted a fiduciary duties 
 
 102. Id. at 958. 
 103. In the aftermath of Boilermakers, Claudia Allen has noted that “The 
interesting part will come when [Delaware corporations] are sued in another 
state.” Partner Claudia Allen Discusses Forum Selection Bylaws with Reuters, 
KATTEN MUNCHIN ROSENMAN LLP (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.kattenlaw 
.com/35869.  
 104. Mirvis, supra note 20 (“It is now plain that board-adopted forum selec-
tion bylaws are valid and enforceable under Delaware law.”). 
 105. Tung, supra note 64, at 6. 
 106. See, e.g., In re Facebook, Inc., IPO Sec. & Derivative Litig., 922 F. 
Supp. 2d 445, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (construing the forum selection clause pro-
cedurally and using Second Circuit precedent to determine its enforceability 
as to derivative plaintiffs); see also Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 
1174−75 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (denying motion to dismiss for improper venue on 
corporate law grounds and instead relying on federal common law).  
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analysis based on the DGCL to determine the enforceability of 
forum selection bylaws. Chancellor Strine in Boilermakers ex-
plicitly refused to reach the necessarily “fact-laden,” case-by-
case fiduciary duties analysis of whether a boards’ use of its by-
laws powers is inconsistent with its fiduciary duties.107 What 
exists, and what courts will be confronted with, are divergent 
views from stockholder-plaintiffs and proxy advisors in one 
camp and scholars,108 now backed by Boilermakers, in anoth-
er.109
A. THE OPPONENTS: FORUM SELECTION BYLAWS ARE BAD 
POLICY, THE BOARD LACKS AUTHORITY, & THE CLAUSES 
VIOLATE DIRECTORS’ FIDUCIARY DUTIES. 
 Neither group fully incorporates forum selection bylaws 
into the necessary fiduciary duties framework that exists in 
other areas of corporate law. The solution fills this void by pro-
posing a step-by-step method of analyzing forum selection chal-
lenges. It builds on DGCL precedent regarding directors’ au-
thority, fiduciary duties, and policy inquiries. In order to reach 
this Solution, this Part will first analyze and refute opponents’ 
authority, fiduciary duties, and policy arguments. Next, it will 
show why proponents’ multi-jurisdictional concerns and author-
ity arguments are warranted and correct, but why they are in-
complete in relation to the necessary fiduciary duties inquiry 
and why the “fiduciary out” alternative should be rejected.  
Proxy advisor groups, such as Glass, Lewis & Co., and 
stockholder-plaintiffs are influential and adamantly against fo-
rum selection bylaws.110 Their views form the policy rationales, 
director authority positions, and fiduciary duties arguments 
that underlie opponents’ criticisms of these clauses.111 The 
proxy advisors have cautioned stockholders against board ef-
forts to include forum selection bylaws, arguing that the claus-
es are detrimental to stockholder interests.112 Some proxy advi-
sory groups have proposed requiring a case-by-case analysis of 
whether the board meets certain good governance practices; 
others suggest an outright ban.113
 
 107. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 947. 
 Stockholders-plaintiffs ap-
pear to be listening to proxy advisor groups and have chal-
 108. See infra Part II(A). 
 109. See infra Part II(B). 
 110. See infra Part II(A)(1). 
 111. See infra Part II(A)(1)–(2). 
 112. See infra notes 118−19. 
 113. See infra Part II(A)(1). 
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lenged forum selection bylaws on authority and fiduciary duties 
grounds, among others.114 Opponents’ positions, however, are 
an inadequate solution to determining the enforceability of fo-
rum selection bylaws outside of Delaware.115 They rest on a 
shaky DGCL foundation that has been soundly rejected in the 
Boilermakers case.116
1. Proxy Advisory Groups: Forum Selection Hurts 
Stockholders 
 The opponents’ arguments will be ana-
lyzed and critiqued; they are organized based on the source of 
the criticism – proxy advisor groups or stock-holder plaintiffs. 
Proxy advisory groups’ stances are based on similar visions 
of appropriate corporate governance policy. They range from an 
unconditional ban to a mediated position that requires certain 
corporate governance features. The Council of Institutional In-
vestors unequivocally opposes adoption of all forum-selection 
provisions because they are not in the best interest of stock-
holders.117 Glass, Lewis & Co., a governance analysis and proxy 
voting firm, recommends against forum selection bylaws with 
limited exceptions.118 MSCI/Institutional Shareholder Services 
Inc. (ISS) has taken a more militated approach. During the 
2011 and 2012 proxy seasons, ISS recommended against forum-
selection provisions unless a corporation follows four “best-
practices governance features.”119
 
 114. See infra Part II(A)(2). 
 These best practices included 
 115. See infra Part III. 
 116. See Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934 
(Del. Ch. 2013); infra Part II(B). 
 117. See COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, supra note 15, at 1.9 
(“Companies should not attempt to restrict the venue for shareholder claims 
by adopting charter or bylaw provisions that seek to establish an exclusive fo-
rum.”). 
 118. John F. Olson et al., ISS, Glass Lewis, and the 2013 Proxy Season, 
HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (Feb. 11, 2013, 
9:20 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/02/11/iss-glass-lewis-and 
-the-2013-proxy-season. This is a change from Glass Lewis’s previous position. 
GLASS LEWIS, supra note 92, at 34 (“Glass Lewis believes that charter or by-
law provisions limiting a shareholder’s choice of legal venue are not in the best 
interests of shareholders. Such clauses may effectively discourage the use of 
shareholder derivative claims by increasing their associated costs and making 
them more difficult to pursue . . . . For this reason, we recommend that share-
holders vote against any bylaw or charter amendment seeking to adopt an ex-
clusive forum provision.”); see also ALLEN supra, note 93, at 5 (adding that 
Glass Lewis also opposes these provisions because they discourage stockholder 
derivative suits by increasing costs). 
 119. Acquila & Kripitz, supra note 92. 
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having an annually elected board, a majority vote standard for 
uncontested director elections, no poison pills, and a meaning-
ful special meeting right for stockholders.120 During the 2012 
proxy season, ISS modified its position by proposing a case-by-
case balancing test that weighs good governance features 
against whether the company has been materially harmed by 
stockholder litigation outside its state of incorporation.121 These 
groups’ recommendations have effectively slowed forum selec-
tion clause adoption via bylaws.122
Overall, stockholders appear to be listening, but data from 
the last few proxy seasons is mixed. During the 2011 proxy sea-
son, stockholders marginally approved certificate forum selec-
tion clauses, but did not repeal any unilaterally, board-adopted 
forum selection bylaws.
  
123 Results from four corporations during 
the 2012 proxy season provide some support for exclusive fo-
rum provisions, but lack predictive value.124 However, in recent 
2012 derivative litigation in the Delaware Court of Chancery, 
stockholders in ten of twelve suits have succeeded in having fo-
rum selection clauses or proposals for them removed; Boiler-
makers is the exception.125
2. The Stockholders: Authority & Breach of Fiduciary Duties 
  
Stockholder-plaintiffs’ complaints are nearly identical and 
levy the same primary arguments against the enforceability of 
forum selection clauses, many of which go beyond the focus of 
this Note.126
 
 120. Id. 
 This Note will limit analysis to authority and fidu-
 121. Id. (removing the “meaningful special meeting” requirement as well). 
 122. Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 5, at 327. 
 123. Acquila & Kripitz, supra note 92. 
 124. Id. (detailing how stockholders did not approve repealing such bylaws, 
but conceding that only two corporations faced this question and that the oth-
er two repealed the bylaws in question). 
 125. See Wagner, supra note 93, at 10. 
 126. Besides the violation of fiduciary duties, they argue that the bylaws 
are: overbroad and apply even if the court lacks personal or subject matter ju-
risdiction, they are not a proper application of the board’s power, they lack 
mutual consent and notice, they conflict with federal constitutional and statu-
tory provisions, they are unreasonable and therefore, invalid, and they force 
the Delaware Court of Chancery to decide non-Delaware law issues. Id. Plain-
tiffs have also argued that they have a vested right under existing bylaws to 
choose their litigation forum. Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 5, at 327−28 
(citing 4 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COR-
PORATIONS § 25:4 (3d ed. 2011) (“In Delaware, the vested-rights doctrine is 
generally recognized as a dead letter, and no contemporary decision is likely to 
be resolved on this basis.”)); see also Kidsco, Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483, 
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ciary duties propositions.127 Stockholders argue that such by-
laws regulate external matters and not internal corporate gov-
ernance and are therefore beyond the board’s authority.128 In 
contractual terms, stockholders have argued that bylaws are 
part of an internal governance contract that the board or stock-
holders have the power to amend.129 Furthermore, forum selec-
tion bylaws lack stockholders’ mutual consent130 and impermis-
sibly regulate litigation, an external corporate activity, instead 
of intra-corporate affairs.131
However, on these authority grounds, stockholder-
plaintiffs ignore the board of director’s broad mandate to man-
age the “business and affairs of every corporation.”
  
132 This pow-
er includes the ability to adopt bylaws that regulate both pro-
cedural and corporate governance matters, which arguably 
include forum selection provisions.133 In Boilermakers, Chancel-
lor Strine unequivocally agreed that such clauses are statutori-
ly valid under DGCL section 109(b) and relate to the “internal 
affairs” of the corporation.134 Stockholder-plaintiffs have a stat-
utory, sacrosanct check under DGCL section 109(a) that ena-
bles them to remove forum selection bylaws, a more efficient 
remedy than pursuing derivative litigation.135
Stockholders also argue that adopting forum selection 
clauses violate directors’ fiduciary duties. They identify direc-
tors’ self-interest and the uninformed basis of their decisions, 
breaches of the duty of care and loyalty, respectively.
 
136
 
492 (Del. Ch. 1995), aff’d, 670 A.2d 1338 (Del. 1995) (“[W]here a corporation’s 
by-laws put all on notice that the by-laws may be amended at any time, no 
vested rights can arise that would contractually prohibit an amendment.”). 
 Direc-
tors’ arguably have a material interest in the adoption of forum 
 127. ALLEN, supra note 93, at 2. 
 128. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (West 2013); see, e.g., Boilermakers 
Verified Complaint, supra note 16, at ¶ 4. 
 129. See, e.g., Boilermakers Verified Complaint, supra note 16, at ¶ 53. 
 130. Id.; Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1171−72 (N.D. Cal. 2011) 
(disputing the layering of corporate and contract law regarding forum selec-
tion bylaws). 
 131. Boilermakers Verified Complaint, supra note 16, at ¶ 74. 
 132. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 109(a), 141(a) (West 2013); see infra Part 
III(A). 
 133. Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 5, at 373–74; see infra Part III(A). 
 134. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 950 
(Del. Ch. 2013). 
 135. Id. at 956 (“[T]he power cannot be non-consensually eliminated or lim-
ited by anyone other than the legislature itself.”); see Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 
582, 588−89 (1933); infra Part III(A). 
 136. ALLEN, supra note 93, at 3. 
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selection clauses because they can confine litigation to a forum 
in which they are more likely to win, they avoid a jury trial, 
and it is difficult to bring certain claims against them.137 In 
Boilermakers, the stockholders-plaintiffs in fact conceded that 
in abstract hypotheticals, forum selection bylaws would work 
without any problem.138 Directors also may have adopted a fo-
rum selection bylaw without negotiation or independent con-
sideration of the Bylaw.139
B. PROPONENTS: A SOLUTION TO THE MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL 
PROBLEM, DIRECTORS’ AUTHORITY, AND SATISFACTION OF 
FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
 Since no cases exist interpreting fi-
duciary duties under the DGCL outside of Delaware, 
proponents’ positions must form the counterpoint to opponents’ 
criticism of forum selection bylaws. 
Proponents of forum selection clauses address and refute 
proxy advisor groups and stockholder-plaintiffs’ policy, authori-
ty, and fiduciary duties arguments.140 Professor Joseph 
Grundfest has led the pro-enforceability charge.141 In addition 
to advocating, he is responsible for crafting the prototypical fo-
rum selection bylaw.142 Corporate defendants who have fought 
the February 2012 barrage of stockholder derivative litigations 
augment Grundfest’s arguments.143
 
 137. See, e.g., Boilermakers Verified Complaint, supra note 
 They establish a counter-
point to plaintiffs’ charges. The Boilermakers decision has 
16, at ¶ 105. 
 138. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 964. 
 139. Derivative Complaint for Shareholders, at ¶ 106, Bushansky v. 
Armacost, No. C 12-01597 WHA, 2012 WL 3276937 (N.D, Cal. Aug. 9, 2012) 
(adding that “the limited disclosure of the Bylaw provides virtually no infor-
mation as to the reasons for and effects of the Bylaw . . . the Bylaw will have 
numerous negative effects on Plaintiff and on the members of the Class”). 
 140. Corporate defendants advance more arguments, but analysis will be 
limited to fiduciary duties and proper bylaw subject matter. Defendants inter 
alia cite the travails of multi-jurisdictional litigation, the failure of alternative 
solutions to forum selection bylaws, and plaintiffs’ parade of horribles. See 
generally Brief for Defendant, Boilermakers, 73 A.3d 934 [hereinafter Brief for 
Defendant, Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund]. Forum selection clauses have 
also been upheld under the Delaware LLC Act. See, e.g., Elf Atochem North 
Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 288− 89, 293 (Del. 1999) (upholding the fo-
rum selection provision in arbitration agreement based on the policy of con-
tractual freedom of the parties).  
 141. See, e.g., Grundfest, supra note 1 passim. 
 142. Id. at 16 (identifying the Netsuite model for 92% of charter and bylaw 
adoptions as of June 30, 2011). 
 143. See Brief for Defendant, Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund, supra note 
140 passim. 
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largely affirmed their efforts.144 Grundfest is not alone; many 
others have supported forum selection bylaws as a useful re-
sponse to the prospect of multi-jurisdictional litigation and en-
trepreneurial plaintiffs.145 Scholars and practitioners alike have 
pointed to how forum selection stymies costly and inefficient lit-
igation by limiting it to one forum.146
The bylaws are a proper application of directors’ authority 
and are a tool of internal corporate governance. Section 109(a) 
of the DGCL empowers directors to adopt bylaws if the charter 
so provides.
 In addition, proponents 
have argued and Boilermakers has affirmed directors’ authority 
to enact forum selection bylaws. 
147 Bylaw provisions are contracts; contract case law 
considers forum selections clauses prima facie valid.148 The 
board possesses a broad mandate under section 109(b) of the 
DGCL to promulgate bylaws.149 Both Chevron and FedEx 
adopted exclusive forum selection provisions for intracorporate 
disputes including derivative, fiduciary duties, DGCL, and oth-
er internal actions.150 These are matters of corporate govern-
ance.151 Proponents’ authority arguments have been accepted by 
the Delaware Court of Chancery in Boilermakers, but the court 
refused to enter the thicket of fact-intensive fiduciary duties 
analysis.152
Leading proponents suggest that forum selection bylaws 
should not be enforced if they violate directors’ fiduciary du-
ties.
 The solution proposed by this Note relies on the 
court’s interpretation of the directors’ authority, and fits it into 
the larger structure of how to determine the enforceability of 
forum selection bylaws in cases with fiduciary duties challeng-
es. 
153
 
 144. Boilermakers., 73 A.3d at 964. 
 This “fiduciary out” provides corporate directors the op-
 145. Id. at 944 n.31. 
 146. Id. at 943. 
 147. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (West 2013).  
 148. See Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 (Del. 
2010) (“Corporate charters and bylaws are contracts among a corporation’s 
shareholders; therefore, our rules of contract interpretation apply.”); see also 
M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972); Carnival Cruise 
Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593−95 (1991). 
 149. See supra Part I(A)(2). 
 150. Brief for Defendant, Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund, supra note 
140, at 27–35.  
 151. Compare id., with Boilermakers Verified Complaint, supra note 16, at 
¶ 53. 
 152. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 964. 
 153. Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 5, at 400–01. 
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portunity to consent to the plaintiffs’ choice of forum if their fi-
duciary duties are implicated.154 Proponents argue that direc-
tors’ choice of forum would not involve their fiduciary duty, “un-
less plaintiffs can demonstrate that Delaware courts will fail to 
hold directors properly responsible for their actions.”155 Effec-
tively, plaintiffs would be charging that they cannot rely upon 
the Delaware judiciary to enforce the boards’ fiduciary duties.156 
The nature of fiduciary duty claims depends on the facts and 
circumstances of individual cases, not those anticipated in the 
abstract.157 Successful claims would be rare; forum selection by-
laws are likely enforceable, even in fiduciary duties contexts.158 
However, a “fiduciary out,” while a useful tool for corporate de-
fendants to concede to jurisdiction, does not provide an articu-
lable method for adjudicating the enforceability of forum selec-
tion bylaws. It places discretion in the hands of corporate 
defendants, but leaves both stockholders and non-Delaware 
courts without a predictable decision-making framework.159
III.  WHERE WILL THEY GO? A GUIDE FOR 
DETERMINING THE ENFORCEABILITY OF FORUM 
SELECTION BYLAWS IN COURTS OUTSIDE OF 
DELAWARE  
 The 
following solution relies on accepted authority arguments and 
builds them into a step-by-step method of adjudicating fiduci-
ary duties in derivative actions. 
This Note proposes a prescriptive framework situated 
within DGCL law. It aims at aiding foreign jurisdictions in de-
ciding the enforceability of forum selection bylaws in fiduciary 
duties derivative suits. The solution provides a step-by-step 
guide. First, in terms of pure power, corporate boards of direc-
tors have the authority under the DGCL and other states’ laws 
to adopt forum selection bylaws.160 Boilermakers confirmed this 
proposition.161
 
 154. Id. at 402. 
 Second, this authority creates a rebuttable pre-
sumption of enforceability of the clauses, buttressed by the 
 155. Id. (adding that the existence of a choice of forum provision alone is 
neither sufficient to prove self-interest, nor a breach of the duty of loyalty). 
 156. Id. at 403. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id.  
 159. See infra Part III. 
 160. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (West 2013). 
 161. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 958 
(Del. Ch. 2013). 
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business judgment rule.162 Finally, in order to rebut this pre-
sumption, stockholder-plaintiffs must establish a violation of a 
fiduciary duty, specifically the duty of care and/or the duty of 
loyalty.163 Specific examples of fiduciary duties violations, de-
pendent on timing, inform this section. The solution develops 
each of these steps and fits the framework into the existing 
DGCL law taken from other contexts that engage in a fiduciary 
duties analysis.164 The novelty of this approach lies in its medi-
ation of defendants’ genuine multi-jurisdictional concerns and 
plaintiffs’ legitimate fiduciary claims, an approach that critics 
have failed to fully address.165
A. STEP 1: THE AUTHORITY OF THE BOARD 
 
Directors’ authority to adopt forum selection bylaws has 
been established by Boilermakers, and it serves as the first step 
of the decision-making framework for jurisdictions outside of 
Delaware.166 As a matter of corporate law, Delaware boards of 
directors have the power to adopt, amend, or repeal bylaws if 
they are so authorized by the certificate of incorporation.167 In 
order to secure this authority, incorporators may simply adopt 
a charter provision prior to the issuance of shares that allows 
the board to adopt bylaws.168 Section 109(a) must be read in 
conjunction with section 141(a) of the DGCL which mandates 
that the, “business and affairs of every corporation organized 
under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction 
of a board of directors.”169 Delaware courts recognize the boards 
possess this “large reservoir of authority.”170 Directors can 
adopt bylaws with a simple majority vote of the quorum pre-
sent at a meeting.171
 
 162. See supra Part I(A)(1). 
 As an application of the board’s power, fo-
 163. See supra Part I(A)(1). 
 164. Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 
1989). 
 165. See supra Parts II(A), (B). 
 166. Boilermakers, 72 A.3d at 954, 963. 
 167. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (West 2013) (“Notwithstanding the 
foregoing, any corporation may, in its certificate of incorporation, confer the 
power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws upon the directors . . . .”). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. § 141(a); see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) 
(“A cardinal precept of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware 
is that directors, rather than shareholders, manage the business and affairs of 
the corporation.”). 
 170. Unocal Corp v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 953 (Del. 1985). 
 171. Tit. 8, § 141(b).  
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rum selection clauses as Vice Chancellor Laster notes, “provide 
an efficient and value-promoting locus for dispute resolution.”172
Directors’ authority to enact forum selection bylaws is con-
sistent with contract law, a point that follows from their au-
thority and that Boilermakers confirms.
  
173 The board possesses 
a broad mandate under section 109(b) of the DGCL to promul-
gate bylaws. Generally, Delaware corporate bylaws regulate 
procedural and corporate governance matters.174 Delaware 
courts employ a “context and purpose” test to determine the 
procedural nature of a bylaw.175 Forum selection clauses adopt-
ed via bylaws, similarly to other procedural bylaws, arguably 
fit within this domain because of their predominantly proce-
dural nature.176
 
 172. In re Revlon, S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 However directors’ authority to adopt forum se-
lection bylaws does not foreclose stockholders from successfully 
challenging and removing the clauses through internal corpo-
rate processes. 
 173. See Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 5, at 381. Contra Victor Brudney, 
Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. LAW REV. 595, 604 
(1997) (“In short, the fiduciary relationship and its obligations serve functions 
not addressed by ‘mere’ contract in a world that puts a premium on individual 
autonomy, let alone in a cooperating world that takes a broader view of the 
psychological and social needs and functions of human beings.”). In the corpo-
rate context, courts impute consent to parties absent “[rejection of] any or all 
of those rules, which they are presumed to be free to do.” Id. at 623. Unilateral 
adoption of bylaws by the board is an example of imputed consent because as-
sent is assumed absent an explicit agreement otherwise. See id. Imputed con-
sent does not mean that stockholders actually consent or that their agreement 
becomes part of a “contractual” agreement. Instead, it remains within the cor-
porate context. See id. at 623−24. 
 174. See McDonnell, supra note 42, at 217, 221; see also CA, Inc. v. 
AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 235 (Del. 2008); Gow v. Consol. 
Coppermines Corp., 165 A. 136, 140 (Del. Ch. 1933) (“[A]s the charter is an in-
strument in which the broad and general aspects of the corporate entity’s ex-
istence and nature are defined, so the by-laws are generally regarded as the 
proper place for the self-imposed rules and regulations deemed expedient for 
its convenient functioning to be laid down.”). 
 175. Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 5, at 373 (citing AFSCME Emps. 
Pension Plan, 953 A.2d at 236−37). 
 176. See id. at 374–75. For example, several procedural-themed bylaws ex-
ist in the DGCL, including inter alia § 141(b) which authorizes bylaws that fix 
the number of directors on the board, quorum requirements, and votes needed 
for board actions; § 211(a) and (b) which establish the date and location for the 
annual stockholder meeting; § 211(d) outlines stockholder special meeting re-
quirements; § 216 establishes quorum and voting requirements for stockhold-
ers; and § 222 which promulgates notice requirements for stockholder meet-
ings. Tit. 8, §§ 141(b), 211(a)−(b), (d), 216. 
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Stockholders have a reciprocal, statutory right to use direct 
or indirect means to remove director-enacted bylaws, without 
resorting to derivative litigation.177 First, stockholders can di-
rectly override the board’s authority to adopt bylaw provisions: 
“[t]he fact that such power has been so conferred upon the di-
rectors or governing body, as the case may be, shall not divest 
the stockholders or members of the power, nor limit their power 
to adopt, amend, or repeal bylaws.”178 Second, stockholders can 
indirectly impose their preferences regarding governance issues 
through the director-election process. For example, if the stock-
holders do not like the actions taken by the board, they can 
elect new directors at the next annual stockholder meeting.179 
Moreover, at any time, even between annual meetings, “[a]ny 
director or the entire board of directors may be removed, with 
or without cause, by the holders of a majority of the shares then 
entitled to vote at an election of directors.”180 Next, a non-
Delaware court would apply a rebuttable presumption of en-
forceability of the clauses based on directors’ authority that is 
buttressed by the business judgment rule.181
B. STEPS 2 & 3: A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF 
ENFORCEABILITY AND HOW TO (POSSIBLY) OVERCOME IT. 
 
Directors’ authority to enact forum selection clauses via by-
laws creates a presumption of their enforceability á la business 
judgment rule.182
 
 177. Delaware corporate stockholders have several options that do not in-
volve derivative litigation. First, they could simply repeal or amend the direc-
tor-enacted bylaw by a simple majority vote (unless the bylaws require a high-
er vote). See Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 588−89 (1933) (explaining that, as an 
incident of stockholders’ ownership and voting power of their shares, they 
have a plenary, statutory right to repeal or amend directors’ bylaws). Second, 
stockholders could except forum selection clauses from the board’s power to 
enact bylaws. See tit. 8, § 141(a). Third, stockholders may take indirect action 
by voting or threatening to vote out directors who adopted the bylaw with the 
forum selection clause. See tit. 8, § 141(k).  
 The business judgment rule forms this start-
ing point for the next step. It provides that directors acted pur-
suant to their fiduciary duties, which means that they acted on 
 178. Tit. 8, § 109(a). 
 179. Tit. 8, § 211(b) (“[A]n annual meeting of stockholders shall be held for 
the election of directors . . . .”). 
 180. Tit. 8, § 141(k). 
 181. See supra Part I(A)(1). 
 182. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 367 (Del. 1993) (explain-
ing that the business judgment rule is an outgrowth from the codified delega-
tion of management powers in § 141(a) of the DGCL).  
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an informed basis, in good faith, and in honest belief the ac-
tions they took were in the best interests of the corporation.183 
The business judgment rules serves as formidable protection 
for corporate directors and officers. In order for stockholder-
plaintiffs to rebut the presumption of enforceability in the con-
text of forum selection clauses, they may introduce evidence of 
directors’ breaches of the duty of care of the duty of loyalty.184
If stockholder-plaintiffs are successful and rebut the pre-
sumption of enforceability, courts should proceed to the third 
step and review the transaction under an entire fairness stand-
ard.
  
185 This necessarily involves a case-by-case inquiry.186 In or-
der to flesh out the second and third steps, which are necessari-
ly intertwined, the solution walks through circumstances that 
may feasibly arise or have arisen in the duty of care and duty of 
loyalty contexts. Unlike in Boilermakers, this exercise does not 
aim to outline a “parade of horribles” or engage with hypothet-
ical, law school-esque scenarios.187
 
 183. Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 
1988) (“As a rule of evidence, [the business judgment rule] creates ‘a presump-
tion that in making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on 
an informed basis [i.e., with due care], in good faith and in the honest belief 
that the action taken was in the best interest of the company.’ The presump-
tion initially attaches to a director-approved transaction within a board’s con-
ferred or apparent authority in the absence of any evidence of ‘fraud, bad 
faith, or self-dealing in the usual sense of personal profit or betterment.’” (se-
cond alteration in original) (citations omitted)). 
 Instead, the purpose of ap-
 184. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (explaining that 
the plaintiff has a burden of proof to rebut this presumption by introducing 
evidence of self-dealing or lack of due care), overruled on other grounds by 
Gantler v. Stevens, 965 A.2d 695 (2009); see supra Part I(A).  
 185. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 362−63 (Del. 1993), 
modified on reargument, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994); Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 
A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993). 
 186. See, e.g., Brown v. Slenker, 220 F.3d 411, 424 (5th Cir. 2000) (“The ex-
istence of a fiduciary duty, and the breach thereof, are both questions of fact.”). 
This approach disavows a bright line rule that advocates for or against the en-
forceability of forum selection clauses. Cf. Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 5, 
at 402 (rejecting a bright-line rule, but articulating a different fiduciary duties 
analysis). 
 187. Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 
934, 958 (Del. Ch. 2013). Compare Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 5, at 364 
(“Courts applying Delaware law to adjudicate the validity of an ICFS provision 
as adopted therefore need not speculate as to every conceivable circumstance 
that might later arise in connection with a future effort to enforce that provi-
sion under conditions that are unknown and unknowable as of the date of the 
provision’s adoption.”), with Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 96 (Del. 1992) 
(“There was no basis to invoke some hypothetical risk of harm rather than an 
examination of the board’s proven, and entirely proper, conduct.”). It is appro-
priate to consider various fact scenarios for the purpose of generating a pre-
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plying this framework in possible situations is that they will 
likely arise in “as-applied” circumstances in future fiduciary 
duties derivative litigation. Therefore, the duty of care will first 
be analyzed, followed by the duty of loyalty. 
1. The Duty of Care 
Plaintiffs may show a violation of the duty of care suffi-
cient to pass step two by demonstrating that directors did not 
engage in a process of informed decision-making.188 This analy-
sis requires consideration of more than whether “Delaware 
courts will fail to hold directors properly responsible for their 
actions.”189 Directors must reach their decision to adopt a bylaw 
with a forum selection clause through “informed, reasonable de-
liberation.”190 Fortunately for directors, the travails of multi-
jurisdictional litigation and the phenomenon of the lead plain-
tiff race are well-documented and easily serve as a basis for 
rational decision.191 In addition, the fiduciaries’ conduct is only 
actionable if the directors are grossly negligent.192 Plaintiffs’ as-
sertions that directors fail to consider the effect of forum selec-
tion clauses on stockholders likely misses this mark sufficient 
to rebut the presumption of enforceability à la business judg-
ment rule.193
 
scriptive decisionmaking framework. In an actual case, the court is bound by 
the facts, not by hypothetical inquiries. These two situations are distinct, and 
prescriptive/normative analysis can inform and construct the decisionmaking 
process. 
 If directors truly were irrational, for example, 
identifying Delaware as an exclusive forum for a Minnesota 
corporation, they may come closer to rebutting the presumption 
of enforceability. Instead, stockholders may be more successful 
 188. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872. This paragraph assumes that the cor-
poration does not have an exculpation provision described in Delaware law. 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2013). 
 189. Contra Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 5, at 402. 
 190. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872.  
 191. See supra Part I(B). Contra Revised Verified Supplement to the Com-
plaint at ¶14, Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 
A.3d 934 (2013) (No. 7220-CS) (“[T]he only duplicative litigation Chevron and 
its Board have experienced resulted from the Exclusive Forum Bylaw whose 
purported purpose was to avoid duplicative litigation.” (emphasis in original)). 
 192. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 907 A.2d 693, 750 
(Del. Ch. 2005) (adding that duty of care violations are rarely found). 
 193. See Verified Complaint at ¶ 95, Neighbors v. Air Prods. & Chems., 
Inc., No. 7240-CS, 2012 WL 467520 (Del. Ch. Feb. 13, 2012) (arguing inter 
alia, that adoption of a form bylaw evinces directors’ lack of consideration of 
the specific terms and effects of the bylaw at issue). 
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in identifying a breach of the duty of loyalty in order to proceed 
to the third step that triggers the “entire fairness” standard. 
2. The Duty of Loyalty 
A successful rebuttal of the presumption of enforceability 
sufficient to proceed to the third step may depend on the timing 
of the duty of loyalty claim. The timing of duty of loyalty chal-
lenges fit into three groups: pre-planning before a suit is filed, 
after alleged wrongdoing, and in the midst of ongoing litigation. 
Similarly to the duty of care context, stockholder-plaintiffs face 
a distinct uphill battle in rebutting the presumption of enforce-
ability sufficient to have a court determine the “entire fairness” 
of the transaction. 
The first scenario is an extension of anti-takeover and poi-
son pill jurisprudence, in which courts allow corporations to 
keep anti-takeover methods on the shelf for potential, future 
use.194 As in that context, it is unlikely that courts would find 
self-dealing if directors adopted a clause as a form of pre-
planning for possible, future derivative litigation.195
In the second scenario, a board’s adoption of a clause after 
alleged wrongdoing provides a clearer self-dealing scenario; 
Galaviz v. Berg can be reconciled in this way.
  
196 In the Galaviz 
scenario, the board can proffer few alternative reasons for their 
actions other than their self-interest in escaping liability.197
 
 194. See Paul H. Edelman & Randall S. Thomas, Selectica Resets the Trig-
ger on the Poison Pill: Where Should the Delaware Courts Go Next?, 87 IND. L. 
J. 1087, 1088−89 (2012) (“Rights plans, or as they are known more pejoratively 
‘poison pills,’ enable a target board to ‘poison’ a takeover attempt by making it 
prohibitively expensive for a bidder to acquire more than a certain percentage 
of the target company’s stock . . . . [Delaware courts generally] have approved 
traditional rights plans as useful bargaining devices for well-intentioned 
boards of directors.”). 
 In 
so doing, they effectively place their self-interest over the best 
interests of the corporation and its stockholders. Although con-
fining litigation to Delaware does not assure directors’ success, 
 195. See Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 5, at 366 (analogizing forum se-
lection clauses to poison pills as a pre-planning tool for hostile takeovers). 
 196. See, e.g., Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1171−72 (N.D. Cal. 
2011). The holding of the Galaviz case can be reconciled with this prescriptive 
framework because, as a matter of corporate law, it implicates a fact scenario 
that involves self-dealing. Contra Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 5, at 407 
(arguing that the Galaviz court ignored controlling precedent when it relied on 
a vested rights theory to find the forum selection clause unenforceable). A self-
dealing supersedes considerations of whether the plaintiffs’ claims have vest-
ed. 
 197. See, e.g., Galaviz, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 1171. 
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it certainly increases their odds.198 Delaware courts confer bene-
fits on directors, strategic advantages that stockholders do not 
necessarily share.199
Finally, directors could also adopt a clause in the midst of 
pending litigation in a foreign court. Again, stockholders could 
implicate directors’ self-dealing incentives in adopting the 
clause.
  
200 This scenario provides a direct affront to contract law, 
although this may be difficult to establish after Boilermakers 
upheld the contractual validity of forum selection in the corpo-
rate context.201 While the enforceability of forum selection 
clauses in contract law is well-settled, contract law likely does 
not allow one party to unilaterally add a forum selection clause 
after litigation has begun.202 Parties must instead resort to hav-
ing cases dismissed, transferred, or stayed.203
C. ALTERNATIVES ARE INEFFECTIVE 
 Though most cas-
es will likely be stalled at the second step, rebutting the pre-
sumption of enforceability of forum selection clauses, the 
possibility of reaching the “entire fairness” standard provides a 
roadmap for courts to follow in these cases. Indeed, it provides 
the best alternative to existing counterarguments. 
Yet alternatives exist. Some advocate an outright ban on 
forum selection bylaws in the corporate context, or a slightly 
more mediated solution as long as directors engage in good 
governance.204 Opponents cannot turn a blind eye to the very 
real inconvenience and waste of resources that is caused by un-
constrained multi-jurisdictional litigation.205
 
 198. See supra Part I(B). 
 In most contexts, 
 199. See supra Part I(B). 
 200. This argument is distinct from whether stockholders have perfected 
their right to sue in a foreign forum. But c.f. Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 
5, at 377 (discussing how stockholders have typically failed to perfect their 
right to sue in a foreign jurisdiction). 
 201. See Galaviz, 763 F. Supp. at 1174 (“To whatever degree bylaws may 
generally be contractual in nature, however, Oracle here seeks to rely on prin-
ciples of corporate law with respect to how its bylaws could be amended. Ora-
cle has not pointed to any commercial contract case upholding a venue provi-
sion that was inserted by a purported unilateral amendment to existing 
contract terms.” (emphasis in original)). Contra Boilermakers Local 154 Re-
tirement Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 955 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 202. See supra Part I(A)(4). 
 203. See id. Whether a court dismisses, transfers, or stays a case depends 
on the court and/or the state.  
 204. See supra Part II(A)(1). 
 205. See supra Part I(B). 
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forum selection clauses provide a useful solution to the travails 
of multi-jurisdictional litigation. A rebuttable presumption of 
enforceability provides plaintiffs with an avenue in which to 
bring legitimate fiduciary duties claims, while weeding out 
strike suits.  
Unconditional enforcement of forum selection bylaws faces 
similar problems, but strikes a different, improper balance. 
Stockholders with possible fiduciary duties’ arguments could be 
locked out of their preferred venues, in a full concession to mul-
ti-jurisdictional problems. Grundfest’s “fiduciary out” solution, 
that allows directors to waive the forum selection bylaw, fits 
with this Note’s proposed solution. Together, they establish a 
compromise: directors monitor their fiduciary duties and stock-
holders may rebut the presumption of directors’ authority. If 
directors concede to a venue or stockholders are successful, liti-
gation proceeds; if not, the case continues in Delaware, which is 
not a bad alternative.  
Finally, doing nothing is not an option. This hotly-debated 
and increasingly-litigated topic demands a solution. This Note 
provides a fiduciary duties-specific solution for courts outside of 
Delaware to when they inevitably encounter these cases. 
  CONCLUSION   
In re Revlon, Galaviz, and Boilermakers began the discus-
sion about the enforceability of forum selection bylaws, but sig-
nificant questions remain. It is unclear how non-Delaware 
courts will interpret this progression of cases, especially when 
plaintiffs raise breach of fiduciary duties claims about directors’ 
uses of the forum selection bylaws. This Note proposes and de-
velops a structure for the resolution of these disputes. Forum 
selection bylaws should be presumptively enforceable because 
of directors’ authority to adopt bylaws. Plaintiffs may challenge 
this rebuttable presumption by showing that directors breached 
their duties of care and/or loyalty. If they are successful, direc-
tors must demonstrate the “entire fairness” of the forum selec-
tion bylaw to stockholders. At all times, directors could waive 
the forum selection bylaws if their fiduciary duties so require. 
In this way, courts mediate a compromise between corporate 
defendants’ and stockholder-plaintiffs’ competing interests and 
in effect, organize this section of intracorporate litigation with-
in existing DGCL precedent. For non-Delaware courts, today 
may not be the day, but when it is, this Note will help them get 
on their way. 
